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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 18314

CHARLES T. BROWN,
Defendant and
Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals

from a conviction of aggravated kid-

napping.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged with forcible sexual abuse and
aggravated kidnapping and tried before a jury on the 20th day
of January, 1982, the Honorable Duffy Palmer, Second District
Court Judge, presiding.

The jury convicted appellant on the

kidnapping charge and acquitted him on the charge of forcible
sexual abuse.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and asks for
a new trial.
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FACTS
The largest part of the testimony in this case centered
around Gale Kuki, the alleged victim.

She testified that during

the preceding two and a half to three years she had an affair
with the appellant.

(T.R. 25)

She testified that on the day

before the incident in question she had gone to Logan to pick
up her granddaughter with a Mr. Dan Thompson.
approximately 5:00 P.M. to 6:00 P.M.
mother's house.

She returned at

that evening to her

At that time she stated she received several

phone calls from the appellant inquiring as to when she expected
to return home (T.R. 27).
house with him.

Ms. Kuki then went to Mr. Thompson's

The appellant called at Mr. Thompson's and was

invited over. (T.R.

27)

The appellant arrived andthe complainant

left shortly thereafter to return home.

On

the way she was

stopped by a police officer for suspicion of driving under the
influence and then released (T.R. 28).
According to the alleged victim, she arrived at home
and the appellant was inside her mobile home, a fact which the
appellant denied.

An argument ensued and Ms. Kuki testified

that she was physically assaulted,

She testified that the fight

lasted continuously for approximately four hours, during which
time she left the mobile home once to run next door (T.R. 33).

She stated the appellant forced her back to her mobile home where
the fight continued.
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somewhat from what she observed at the scene.
Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the
photographs on the grounds that (1)

They did not accurately

depict the observations of Ms. Johnson, and (2)

Any probative

value was outweighed by the prejudice to the Defendant.
photographs were admitted.

The

(T.R. 31).

The defense called Barbara Brown, the appellant's
wife to the stand.

Mrs. Brown testified as to a long history

of harassment by Ms. Kuki.
The appellant testified in his own behalf.

The appell-

ant testified of a long and stormy relationship with Ms. Kuki,
lasting two and one-half to three years.

He stated that on the

night the incident occurred he arrived at Ms. Kuki's mobile
home after she had arrived.

He said that they were to prepare

for a fishing trip the next day.

They talked for approximately

one hour before an argument began (T.R. 157).

He testified that

Ms. Kuki threw a glass and then slapped him while he sat in a
chair.
injured.

A pushing match ensued and appellant's shoulder was
Appellant admitted that he bit Ms. Kuki in an effort

to gain his release (T.R. 163).
calmed and appellant left.

At some point the situation

He was arrested later that morning.

Defense counsel requested that the court instruct the
jury as to simple assault, alleging it to be a lesser included
offense to the charge of aggravated kidnapping, as well as self-
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defense.

The court refused and appellant's counsel excepted

(T.R. 107).
ARGUMENT

POINT

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY AS TO SELF-DEFENSE.
Defense counsel requested that the judge instruct the
jury on the theory of self defense (T.R. 107).

Such request was

denied and the jury was given no instruction dealing with self
defense.

Utah Code Annotated

S 76-2-402

provides that:

A person is justified in threatening or using
force against another when and to the extent
that he reasonably believes that such a force is
necessary to defend himself or a third person
against such other's inuninent use of unlawful
force.
Generally, if evidence is introduced at trial which would
raise the issue of self defense, an instruction is required.

In a

leading case, although the instruction was not given, this court
discussed the standard to be applied in determining whether to
instruct the jury on a self defense theory.
If the defendant's evidence, although in material
conflict with the State's proof, be such that the
jury may entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether
or not he acted in self-defense, he is entitled to
have the jury instructed fully and clearly on the
law of self-defense. Conversely, if all reasonable
men must conclude that the evidence is so slight
as to be incapable of raising a reasonable doubt in
the jury's mind as to whether a defendant accused of
a crime acted in self-defense, tendered instructions
thereon are properly refused.
State v, Castillo, 457, P.2d 618,619 (Utah 1968)

5
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In the case before the court the evidence concerning
self defense came mainly from two sources.

The appellant

testified extensively about the aggression by Ms. Kuki (T.R.
157-163).

He stated that she slapped him, threw and broke a

glass, pushed him, and severely injured his shoulder, which he
said she knew to be injury prone.

He stated that the actions

he took were in response to her acts.

Additionally, Detective

Ball stated that appellant, in a statement made the morning
after the incident, told Ball essentially the same story
(T. R. 116) .

There is no question that this is in material conflict
with the state's evidence.

However, it was at least substantial

enough and credible enough, to entitle appellant to the instruction.

It should be noted in this regard that the "victim", Ms.

Kuki admitted to striking appellant several times, and to tearing
his shirt, indicating some force, although she characterizes her
actions as defensive (T.R. 73).
This court has stated the rule in a different way in
State v. Johnson, 112U.130,185 P.2d 738 (1947). After reviewing
many previous cases the court noted that in cases where the
defendant's request for instructions was sustained, defendant's
evidence established a state of facts which, if believed by the
jury, established adequate provocation, lawful acts on the part
of the defendant, or other facts justifying defendant's actions.
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In other words, if the evidence offered is believed, defendant
could conceivably make out his defense and the jury should be
instructed accordingly.
In this case, had the jury been properly instructed and
had they believed the testimony of the appellant, a jury could
have seriously entertained a reasonable doubt as to whether or
not appellant acted in self-defense, and there can be no question
that failure to instruct the jury in this regard is reversible
error, where the jury is precluded from even considering the
evidence and theory of the defendant.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ASSAULT
WITH RESPECT TO THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING.
Defense counsel requested that the court instruct the
jury as to simple assault, arguing that it was a lesser included
offense of aggravated kidnapping.

Two Utah statutes govern

whether a defense instruction as to a lesser included offense
will be given,

Section 77-33-6 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, states:

The jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense
the conunission of which is necessarily included in
that which he is charged in the indictment of information, or of any attempt to connnit the offense.
Section 76-1-402 (4), U.C.A. provides that:
The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury
with respect to an included offense unless there is
a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense.
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This court has restated this rule in State v. Dougherty,
550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976).

Discussing with approval principles

laid down in a Nevada case, Lisby v. State, 82 Nev. 183, 414
P. 2d 593 (1966), this court stated that
if there be any evidence, however slight, on any
reasonable theory of the case under which the
defendant might be convicted of a lesser included
offense, the court must, if requested, give an
appropriate instruction. Lisby v. State, supra
at 177.
The court in Lisby v. State, supra, discussed three
categories of cases wherein the question of giving lesser ineluded instructions arose.

First, cases wherein there is evidence

which would absolve defendant from the greater offense, or degree,
but would support a finding of guilt on the lesser offense.
such cases the instruction is mandatory.

In

Second, cases where

the elements differ or evidence shows that defendant is not guilty
of the lesser crime, wherein the instruction is inappropriate.
Third, a situation where the greater crime necessarily includes
all elements of the lesser crime, where the greater crime could
not be committed without having the intent and doing the acts
which constitute the lesser crime.

In such cases the instru-

ction should be given unless the state has conclusively proved
the greater crime and there is no evidence which would tend to
reduce the greater offense, if believed by the jury.
This case would seem to fall within the third category,
specifically, that all of the elements of assault are included
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able, a proper foundation must be made and the pictures must
be shown not to be misleading
572 P. 2d 72 (Alaska 1977).

Kaps Transport, Inc. v. Henry,
That test was not met in this case.

Further, Ms. Johnson went on to give value judgments about the
photographs.

This clearly undermines the purpose behind the

authentication requirements and the photos should have been
excluded.

CONCLUSION
The facts as presented at trial clearly raised the
issue of self defense, both by the defense and state witnesses.
The court erred in removing this aspect of the trial from consideration by not properly instructing the jury.

As the ele-

ments of aggravated kidnapping overlapped the elements of
assault, and as the evidence raised doubts as to guilt on the
greater offense, the court should have instructed the jury on
the lesser included offense.

Finally, the court should not have

admitted photographic evidence which, admittedly, did not
accurately depict what it was represented to show.

By taking

the major portion of the defense theory away from the jury, the
court committed reversible error and the conviction for aggravated kidnapping must be reversed and appellant granted a new
trial.
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within the elements of aggravated kidnapping.
The elements of the assault instruction which defense
counsel urged on the court are as follows:
1.
2.
3.

an attempt;
with unlawful force or violence;
to do bodily injury to another. U.C.A. 76-5-102

The elements of aggravated kidnapping, as applicable
to this case are:
1. intentional and knowingly;
2. by force, threat or deceit;
3. detains or restrains another against his will with
intent;
4. to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the
victim or another. (U.C,A. 76-5-302)
A bare reading and comparison of these elements reveals
that it will be almost impossible to sustain a conviction of
aggravated kidnapping without also proving all of the elements
of assault.

Furthermore, the previous discussion of the facts

clearly shows that the evidence presented required the court to
give the instruction as requested.
There was a dispute in the evidence as to whether or not
Ms. Kuki was detained or restrained against her will.

She test-

ified that she was restrained, while the appellant denied that was
the case.

No other testimony or evidence was offered.
In analyzing the elements it can be seen that if the

jury had a reasonable doubt as to the question of restraint, but

9
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they were satisfied as to the remaining elements, an assault,
as defined above, would be proved.

Thus, according to the

applicable statutes and case law, it was error on the part
of the lower court to refuse to instruct the jury as to assault,
a lesser included offense.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PHOTOGRAPHS,
AS THEY DID NOT ACCURATELY DEPICT THE OBSERVATIONS
OF THE VICTIM.
The state at trial introduced several photographs of
Ms. Kuki, taken the morning after the incident (state's Exhibits
D through J).

The items were authenticated by Virginia Johnson,

a secretary of the Layton Police Department, who took the photographs.

She testified that Exhibits D through J were not the

same photographs she took, but were enlargements, apparently made
by the county attorney, who checked them out of evidence.

She

was also the evidence officer and did not see them until they
were shown to her at trial.
When asked whether the photographs accurately depicted
what she observed, she stated they did not, that they differed
somewhat.
The general rule is that before photographs can be admissable they must be shown to be fair, accurate and truthful representations of what they purport to depict.

Ross v. Colorado National

Bank of Denver, 463 P.2d 882 (Colo. 1969).
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